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CASESNONNISSE 
UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHM,ENT: 
HAVING A FRIEND WEARING . DIFFERENT 
HATS, WHO NEEDS ENEMIES? 
Mndi v Malgas 2006 2 SA 182 (EPD) 
1 Introduction 
101 
The decision in the present case is important for enrichment law within the 
context of the confirmation and application of : (a) the general requirements 
of an enrichment action; and (b) the quantum rule pertaining to an 
enrichment claim. The identification of the particular enrichment action and 
the specific requirements thereof did not receive the express attention of the 
court. It will be shown· that the approach of the court of relying only on the 
general requirements of an enrichment action can only be followed if the 
specific requirements of the appropriate condictio would not have led to a 
different result. Application of one of the requirements of the condictio 
indebiti, namely that the undue payment must legally be considered to have 
been paid to the receiver (recipiens) of the payment, would have ensured a 
more just result by the Court. As will be seen in 5 2 below the relevance of 
the defence of reduction or loss of enrichment in this case has been raised 
by other academics and will only briefly be referred to a~ it falls beyond the 
scope of our case discussion. The decision also dealt with the issue whe~her 
the relationship between the enriched person and the other members of the 
club constituted a separate legal entity. The Court did not consider whether 
the relationship between the members of the club could have constituted a 
partnership and that the impoverished person contracted with the enriched 
person in her capacity as a partner in a partnership. 
2 Facts 
During January ·1998 Malgas (respondent) and Mndi (appellant) entered i'nto 
an oral agreement in terms of which Mndi agreed to lend Malgas R6 000 at 
an interest rate of 30% per month. The maximum r(\lte allowed in terms of 
section 2(1 )(a) of the Usury Act 73 of 1968 is 2,67% per month. It was a tacit 
term of the agreement that Malgas would repay the loan as soon as she was 
able to do so. On 3 December 1998 Malgas paid Mndi an amount of 
R34 692,60 being the sum of the capital and R28 692,60 as interest 
claimed. The circumstances of the loan were such that the profit generated 
by the loan was equally shared between Mndi and five other members of the 
Masikhule Club. The club had six members. Each member was required to 
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contribute funds. These funds were (Emt to its members, who in turn lent it to 
third :parties at the rate of 30% per month. The money was lent to members 
for money-lending activities. The members then collected the loans and 
interest payable and paid it all to the club for division amongst its members 
at the end of each year. Upon failure of a member to collect and pay 'over 
(oans and interest, outstanding amounts were deducted from what was 
otherwise due to that member at the end of the year. 
Malgas succeeded in the magistrate's court in a claim based upon unjust 
enri~hment, for repayment by Mndi of the difference between the interest 
paidt at the agreed rate and the interest payable at the legal rate of 15,5% 
per annum. On appeal to the Proviricial Division the court mero motu raised 
the issue of the correctness of the quantum of the magistrate's award. 
3 Arguments 
The respondent alleged that: (a) in terms of an allegedly implied term in the 
agreement regarding interest, the appellant was not entitled in terms of the 
Usury Act to charge interest that exceeded the capital amount of the loan or 
2,67% per month (1B4F-G); (b) the payment was made "in the bona fide and 
reasonable belief that it was owing and payable" (184H); and (c) as a result 
of the payment, the appellant was enriched by the amount of R26 772.60, 
alternatively R22 692.60 (184H). 
It: was submitted on behalf of the .respondent that the respondent owed 
the appellant the amount of R6 000) plus interest at the rate of R2,67% per 
mOl)th, compounded monthly, beil')Q the total amount over a period of 11 
months of RB 017t 27 (capital amount of R6 000 plus interest on the amount 
of ~2 017,27) (187H). 
ljhe appellant in essence denied having: (a) concluded the agreement 
with the respondent in her personal capacity; (b) contravened the Usury Act 
be~use the respondent was made ,aware of the interest charged by the club 
on (loans; or (c) being unjustly enriched because the amount claimed 
accrued to the Masikhule Club and "not to her personally (1841-J). 
4 Issues 
The issues to be decided by the court were firstly, whether the appellant 
acted as the agent of the Masikhule CJub (or its members) in her dealing 
with the respondent. Secondly, if the appellant did not act as an agent of the 
Clyb, whether she was unjustly e~riched at the expense of the respondent 
anc;t, if so, the extent of unjustified ~richment (186B-C). 
5 Decision 
5' The court accepted on the evidence that the appellant did not act as 
agent of the club or its members including herself (186F-187D). The 
court noted that the club had no legal personality. The club had no 
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written constitution and because it had the express purpose of making a 
profit the club was prevented from acquiring legal personality through 
the common law. 
5 2 The court found that the loan agreement between the parties was 
unenforceable only to the extent of the excessive interest. Excessive" 
interest constitutes the interest that exceeds the maximum rate of 
2,67% per month permitted in terms of a determination made under 
section 2(1)(a) of the Usury Act (187D-G). The Court relied on the 
following formulation of the effect of usurious transactions in Prudential-
Shippers SA Ltd v Tempest Clothing Co (Pty) Ltd (1976 2 SA 856 (W) 
861A): 
"It is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act and its precursor, the 
Usury Act 37 of 1926, were not intended to render a transaction in which 
usurious interest is charged a turpis causa, with the rel1iult that the lender 
may recover neither his capital nor interest at the permissible rate. He is 
entitled to judgment for such amounts, but "not for the excessive interest." 
The court found that the respondent paid interest of R28 629,60 but 
was only obliged to pay a maximum of R2 017,27 iri interest in terms of 
the Usury Act (189A-B). 
The court indicated that in order for the respondent t~ have 
succeeded in her claim against the appellant, she must have 
established the following general requirements for liability based on 
enrichment (188A-C), namely that: 
(a) The appellant has been enriched 
The court found that the appellant was (at least) enriched by the amount 
that the respondent paid to her over and above the amount that she 
would have paid had the appellant charged the maximum amount 
permitted in terms of the Usury Act (188C-D). The respondent paid 
interest of R28 629,60 but was only obliged to pay a maximum of 
R2 017,27 in interest (189B). This would mean that the enrichment is 
the difference between the two amounts - an amount of R26 612.33 
(the court actually calculated impoverishment). The court also found that 
the magistrate erred in assuming that the maximum interest rate that the 
appellant was entitled to and could enforce was the legal rate and not 
the maximum permitted in terms of a determination made under section 
2(1 )(a) of the Usury Act (189E). 
Although the cour:t never doubted enrichment taking place, the 
quantum thereof was in issue (188C). As to the quantum of enrichment 
the court decided: 
'While the full amount of the respondenfs impoverishment went into and 
through the appellant's estate, it would in my view be simplistic and 
inaccurate to say that she was enriched by that amount. In truth, a portion 
of it only enriched her: the interest was to be divided equally among the 
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members of the club. Her est~te was thus only enriched by one-sixth of 
the excess interest, an amounfof R4 435,40" (189C-D). 
The court found that the. magistrate erred in assuming that the 
appellanfs estate was enriched by the full amount by which the 
respondent's estate had been impoverished (189E-F). 
Sonnekus ("Wegval of Vermindering van Verryking as Verweer" 2006 
Stell LR 454 458), construed the above dictum of the court as in effect 
upholding ,the defence of reduction or loss of enrichment. He contended 
that this defence gives effect to the enrichment premise that the 
quantum of an enrichment claim is the lesser of either the amount of 
enrichment of the defendant or impoverishment of the plaintiff at litis 
contestatio (Sonnekus 2006 $tell LR 458). The Court indeed accepted 
the quantum rule (188G-189A). As indicated before, the Court found 
that the enrichment of the appellant was only by one-sixth of the 
excessive interest, namely R4. 435,40. Thus, the enrichment claim of the 
respondent is the lesser of tne enrichment (subdivided by six) of the 
appellant or the impoverishment of the respondent. 
Sonnekus {2006 Stell LR 458}, indicated that exceptions to the 
quantum rule, however, have' been acknowledged in the common law. 
One of the exceptions mentioned concerns the defend~nt who had 
knowledge or .implied knowledge of the unjust enrichment. If the 
enriched party was aware of the unjust enrichment or where such 
knowledge is imputed to him. he cannot plead reduction of the quantum 
of enrichment {Sonnekus 2006 Stell LR 458-459}. Sonnekus 
convincing-Iy argued that the court neglected to refer to the qualification 
of the enrichment principle {Sonnekus 2006 Stell LR 459-460}. He 
further argued that the appellant should have been aware that the 
claimed interest rate was illegal and the reception of the money in her 
account unjustified (Sonnekus 2006 Stell LR 459). In other words, 
because of the said knowledge. the appellant should not have been 
allowed to claim a reduction of the enrichment. 
Visser ("Unjustified Enrichment" '2005 Annual Survey 291 294) also 
refers to the above-mentioned failure on the part of the court: 
"According to South African Law, where the defendant knew, or ought to 
have known, that he or she had been unjustly enriched, he or she has a 
duty to preserve the enrichment and can, therefore, plead loss of 
enrichment only if it can be shown that the loss of enrichment was not 
culpable." 
(b) The respondent had been impoverished 
According to the court impoverishment of the respondent took place by 
having paid substantially more interest than she ought to have in terms 
of the law (188D-E). The court found that the impoverishment of the 
respondent is the difference between the interest paid (R28 629,60) and 
the maximum of R2 017.27 being an amount of R26 612,33 (189A-B). 
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(c) The' appellant's enrichment was at the expens~ 
of the respondent 
The court found that the appellant's enrichment (whatever its quantum) 
was undoubtedly at the expense of the respondent (188E). 
(d) The enrichment was unjustified 
According to the court this requirement was also satisfied in that the 
enrichment was unjustified as it was sine causa in the sense that there 
was "no sufficient ground recognized by law (causa) to justify the 
transfer ... of value" from the estate of the respondent to that of the 
appellant (188E-F). The court seemed to have favoured the approach 
that an absence of a causa for the transfer of value and not retention. of 
the value should be required. (As to the different approaches, see 
Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment: A Casebook 2ed (1999) 
27-28). 
6 Comments 
6 1 Once one accepts that the club had no legal personality the question 
arises whether the relationship between the members of the club could 
be regarded as a partnership. A partnership is established when the 
prospective partners conclude a partnership agreement with one 
another. A partnership can be defined as a legal relationship based on 
an agreement between two or more persons, who undertake ;to 
contribute something legal (own emphasis added) to ~n enterprise which 
is carried on with the object of making a profit and sharing it with the 
partners (Uys v Le Roux 1906 TS 429 432-433; Novick v Benjamin 1972 
2 SA 842 (A) 851; and Gcilitshana v General Accident Insurance Co SA 
Ltd 1985 2 SA 376 (C) 370). 
A partnership agreement is a contract and wilt have to comply with the 
general requirements for a valid contract, namely that parties should 
have contractual capacity, parties should reach consensus, the 
agreement must be legal, performance must be possible and contractual 
formalities (if any) should be complied with (E}enade, Henning, Du 
Plessis, Delport, De Koker, Pretorius Entrepreneurial Law 3ed (2003) 
18). A contract would be illegal if the conclusion, performance or the 
purpose of the contract is prohibited by statute' or contrary to public 
morals (Joubert, Faris and Harms "Contract" LAWSA Vol 5 Part 1 2ed 
(2004) 165). Whether the agreement would be regarded as void 
depends on the intention of the legislature (Joubert et a/165 fn 1). To 
determine whether the legislature intended the agreement to be null and 
void would require interpretation of the provisions of each statute 
(Joubert et a/166). The court decided that the intention of the legislature 
was not to render the whole transaction void. The provisions that relate 
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to the charging of excessive interest were regarded as void (187G-H). If 
one accepts the court's interpretation then the requirement of legality for 
a partnership agreement will be complied with. 
I: 
One of -the naturalia of a partnership agreement is that each partner 
has the power to represent the partnership when concluding 
transactions that fall within the partnership business (Benade et al 24). If 
one accepts that the association of the members is a partnership the 
app~lIant would have had the power to bind the partnership in 
transactions that fall within ~~e scope of the partnership business 
(Benade et a/ 39). Entering into the loan agreement with the respondent 
would fall within the scope of the partnership business and the appellant 
would be correct in arguing that she did not enter into the loan 
agreement in her personal capacity but that she was acting within her 
mutual mandate as a partner wi~hin the partnership business, which was 
the lending of money. A third" party does not have to prove that the 
partn~r had the necessary authority to conclude the 'agreement on behalf 
of the partnership. but only has to prove that the particular transaction 
fell within the ambit of the partnership business (8enade et a/40). 
However, the intention of the parties in the loan agreement would then 
determine whether the partnership is a party to the agreement. Where 
there was an intention that the loan agreement was between the lender 
and the partnership, one can argue that the "partners". in terms of their 
mutual mandate. were responsible to collect the payments of capital plus 
interest from the persons to whom they lent money on behalf of the 
partnership and pay the proceeds back to the partnership. On this 
in.terpretati~n it can be accepted that the individual partners were 
enriched by the pro rata proP9rtion of the interest which they received 
from the appellant. ' 
However, if the intention of the appellant and the respondent was that 
a loan agreement would be entered into between them in their personal 
capaCities, the fact that the interest was shared amongst the members of 
the club after the loan was repaid should therefore not have had a 
bearing on the court's decision~' 
, 
The activity which the club was involved in can also be described as a 
"stokvel". The court in Ma/gas did not consider whether the club was a 
stokvel. A detailed discus'sion 'of stokvels falls outside the ambit of this 
case discussion but a couple of introductory comments will nevertheless 
be made. A stokvel is an association of persons who embark on an 
enterprise voluntarily and independently to meet their own socio-
economic needs. An important feature of a stokvel is the fact that 
members of the stokvel all participate in the running of the stokvel. On 4 
January 1994 the Registrar of, Banks issued a government notice that 
introduced the common bond principle, whereby schemes such as 
stokvels, credit unions and employees' savings clubs could lawfully 
conduct their resp~ctive operations within South Africa, provided that 
slich schemes are operated' within the scope and ambit of the 
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Government Notice. (Illegal banking Report: Report by ESAF to the 
Committee of Central Bank Governers in SADC -, 22 October 1997). At 
the end of the same year in which the Ma/gas decision was reported a 
definition of a stokvel was provided in GG 22412 of 2006-12-01. Item 1 
of the schedule describes the term stokvel as: 
(i) a formal or informal rotating credit scheme with entertainment social 
and economic functions; . 
(ii) fundamentally consists of members who have pledged mutual 
support to each other towards the attainment of specific objectives; 
(iii) established a continuous pool of capital by raising funds by means of 
the subscriptions of members; 
(iv) grants credit to and on behalf of members; 
(v) provides for members to share in profits and to nominate the 
management; 
(vi) relies on self-imposed regulation to protect the interest of its 
members. 
The court in Ma/gas had the opportunity to examine the legal 
relationship between the ,members and the stokvel itself. but this was 
unfortunately not done. It is accepted that stokvels and the informal 
savings market are the oldest and biggest forms of self empowerment 
within the black community (BEE in Stokvels Http://www.stokvelonline. 
com/asp/content.asp?id=3). 
6 2 The court decided the enrichment issue by relying solely in terms of the 
general requirements for an enrichment action (see also Visser 2005 
Annual Survey 294; and Sonnekus 2006 Stell LR 457). The approach of 
relying on general principles can be followed unless the distinctive rules 
applying only to a particular condictio still apply (see McCarthy Retail Ltd 
v Shortdistance Carriers CC 2001 3 SA 482 (SCA) 489B-C). According 
to Visser (2005 Annual Survey 294) a departure from the normal rules of 
the condictio can only be justified if such departure is shown to be 
appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The requirement obviously 
cannot be ignored completely (Visser 2005 Annual Survey 294-295). It 
therefore seems worthwhile to investigate whether the specific require-
ments of a condictio might have led to another result. The McCarthy 
decision involved a claim for enrichment due to improvement of another 
person's property. Whether an action for compensation for 
improvements or preservation of property will lie in a particular case 
depends on the category to which the possessor or holder/occupier who 
incurred the expenses belong. and on the circumstances under which 
the expenses were incurred (Lotz (updated by Brand) "Enrichment" 
LAWSA 2ed Vol 9 (2005) 128). As an enrichment claim. the claim for 
enrichment due to improvement of another person's property. has t9 
meet the general requirements of an enrichment action (see Lotz 111). 
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The inference can be drawn from the reported facts that the 
respondent relied on the condictio indebiti (mention is made of the 
statement of the respondent in the pleadings that the payment was 
made "in the bona fide and reasonable belief that it was owing and 
payable" I which refers to the "reasonable mistake" requirement of the 
condictio indebiti (see also Sonnekus 2006 SteJl LR 456). The court 
accepted that charging usurious interest rendered the agreement 
unenforceable, which acceptance also points towards the condictio 
indebiti. {If argued that the lagreement was illegal in so far as the 
.usurious interest only, the agreement would also have been enforceable 
in this respect and pointing towards application of the condictio ob 
turpem vel iniustam causam. )The condictio op turpem vel iniustam 
causam is, however, not available. Any agreement to charge more than 
the maximum rate of interest y.tas invalid, though not turpis and therefore 
not subject to the par delictum rule (Visser 2005 Annual Survey 292). 
For purposes of this discussion it is therefore accepted that the condictio 
indebiti was in casu the most appropriate condictio. The specific 
requirements of the condictio indebiti in casu are as follows: (a) payment 
of money; (b) which has taken place indebiti in the widest sense, that is, 
there must have been no legal or natural obligation to pay the money; (c) 
payment in the mistaken belief that the debt was due; (d) the mistake 
must be excusable; and (d) the undue payment must in law be 
considered to have been paid to the receiver of the payment (see Lotz 
116-117). 
As to the requirement of t6e condictio indebiti: Visser points out that 
one would have expected the court to investigate, whether or not the 
respondent's payment of the: excess interest had indeed been "in the 
bona fide and reasonable be'lief that it was owing and payable", as she 
had averred in her pleadings·that it was. Payment of interest, which was 
excessive and not due. assumingly took place. It seems as if such 
payment was made in the mistaken belief that it was due. Payment of 
excessive interest seems excusable by a person without access to 
acceptable credit. (As to whether a mistake is reasonable and factors 
used in making such a determination, see Willis Faber Enthoven (pty) 
Ltd v Receiver of Revenue 1992 4 SA 202 (A) 224C and 224E-H). 
The only outstanding requirement of the condictio indebiti relates to 
the question whether the payment has legally been paid to the receiver 
of the payment. The person who physically received the money or 
benefited from it is not nece~arily in law regarded as the recipiens (Lotz 
116). The person who physieally received the money could be a mere 
nominee, conduit or agent of the recipiens (Lotz 116). It is submitted that 
the decisions relied upon by Lotz could be of further assistance. 
Regarding a nominee of the recipiens: In Licences and General 
Insurance Co v Ismay (1951 2 SA 456 (EDLD) 461 G-462E), it was held 
that an insurance company which paid money to a third party under the 
mistaken belief that it was obliged to compensate the insured against 
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liability against the third party, was entitled to claim from the insured with 
the condictio indebiti. The court relied on Pothier in his edition of the 
Digest (12.6.40) that says: "I am understood to pay to someone not only 
when I pay himself but also when I pay another on his order" (Licences 
and General Insurance Co v Ismay supra 4628). The court found that 
the defend~nt required the insurance company to dispose of the claims 
for damage in terms of the insurance policy (Licences and General 
Insurance Co v Ismay supra 462F). The court further found that the 
provisions in the policy in regard to the payment to the defendant's car 
and the settlement in his name of a third party's claim, provide the 
manner in which the indemnity may be paid (Licences and General 
Insurance Co v Ismay supra 462F-G). The court found that the 
declaration set out sufficiently what amounts to a mandate to the 
company and found that payment was made with the knowledge of the 
defendant (Licences and General Insurance Co.v Ismay supra 462G). 
According to the Court there could be no right to recover from the third 
party as the payment was made on behalf of the insured (Licences and 
General Insurance Co v Ismay supra 461G-H; and see also RandcoaJ 
Services Ltd v Randgold and Exploration Co Ltd 1998 4 SA e25 {SCA} 
843B-0). In the Randcoal Services Ltd decision Van Heerden DCJ held 
that the Ismay decision had held that the "condictio indebiti lies against 
the person who in law is considered to have received the money" 
(Randcoal Services Ltd v Randgold and Exploration Co Ltd supra 843C-
D). In the Randcoal the court found that the Ismay decision proceeded 
from the premise that the insurer had no right to claim from the th,ird 
party since the payment had been made "on behalf of the insured" 
{Randcoal Services Ltd v Randgold and Exploration Co Ltd supra 8430-
E}. In Minister van Justisie v Jaffer (1995 1 SACR 292 (A) 297F-H), it 
was held that the principle had been accepted in Roman Dutch law and 
modern South African law that a payment is made to a person whether it 
was made to the person personally or to another person at his or t)er 
instruction. The condictio indebiti is available against the first mentioned 
person (see also RandcoaJ Services Ltd v Randgold and Exploration Co 
Ltd supra 843E-G). 
Regarding an agent or conduit of a recipiens:' In Phillips v Hughes; 
Hughes v MaphumaJo (1979 1 SA 225 (NPD) 226), a motor carrier 
certificate had been sold in execution of a magistrate's judgment against 
a debtor by the messenger of the court. The purchaser of the certificate 
paid the purchase price to the messenger of the court who divided the 
residue among five creditors of the debtor. Unknown to everyone 
involved in the sale in execution, the certificate had already been sold 
and transferred from the debtor to someone else. A contingency like that 
tiad not been envisaged and the terms of the sale had not provided for it. 
The purchaser claimed payment from some execution creditors to whom 
payment was made by the messenger of the court with the condictio 
indebiti (Phillips v Hughes; Hughes v Maphumalo supra 228G-H). In 
deciding that the remedy "does not hit" the partic~lar creditor (Phillips v 
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Hughes; Hughes v Maphuma/o supra 228H). Didcott J reasoned as 
follows: 
"The condiclio indebili does not entitle the so/v ens to pursue what was 
mistakenly paid. wherever it goes. The recovery of the undue payment 
from its recipiens is the action's sole objective ... This means that the 
condictio indebili is enforceabl~ against the recipiens of the undue 
payment. but nobody else. The fT;Jcipiens is not necessarily the person into 
whose hands the money was actually put when it was paid. He is the one 
who must be considered. in all the circumstances of the case. truly to have 
received the payment. Whenever a payment is made to an agent with 
authority to accept it. for instance. the recipiens is the principal and not the 
agent. A conduit through whom a payment passes is likewise not its 
recipiens. Instead he who obtains payment by such means is. One is not 
the recipiens of a paY!1lent. on the other hand. merely because it was 
intended or happens in the result to benefit one. That, on its own, does not 
count. All that matters is whether one can appropriately be said to have 
received the payment in some or other way. Unless one has done so, one 
is beyond the range of the condictio indebili. for all the payment's auxiliary 
advantages to one" (Phillips v Hughes; Hughes v Maphumalo supra 228w 
229G). 
According to the court when all is said and done, the crux of the 
matter is as follows: 
"The condictio indebiti is aimed at the recipiens of the particular payment 
which was m~de.indebiti by or on behalf of the claimant. It cannot be used 
against the recipiens of any othe~ payment, even if such be regarded as a 
consequence of the one in issue" (Phillips v Hughes; Hughes v 
Maphuma/o supra 231 B-e). 
Didcott J explained: 
"The recipiens of a payment is surely. once and for all, the person 
receiving it at the moment of its receipt" (Phillips v Hughes; Hughes v 
Maphuma/o supra 230H). 
The court found that the messenger did not act as agent for the 
creditor or any other individual when he received the payment from the 
purchaser (Phillips v Hughes; Hughes v Maphuinalo supra 229G). 
The court also draw a distinction between: (a) the payment made by 
the purchaser to the messenger that resulted from a contract between 
lhe purchaser and the messenger; and (b) the messenger's subsequent 
payments to the execution creditors in terms of the statute and the Rules 
9f Court (Phillips v Hughes; Hughes v Maphumalo supra 230C-G). In the 
words of Didcott J: 
"The' transactions, in short, involved different parties, different causes. 
different purposes and differetJt ·results. This is no technical appraisal. It 
strikes me. on the contrary. as t~e only realistic one" (Phillips v Hughes; 
Hughes v Maphuma/o supra 230G-H), 
The court found that the messenger of the court was the recipiens of 
the purchaser's payment, whilst the execution creditors were the 
'recipientes of the messenger'~ payments to them (Phillips v Hughes; 
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Hughes v Maphuma/o supra 231C). Thus, the creditors were not 
recipients of the purchaser's payment. 
To summarise: The following persons are not recipiens of an undue, 
payment: (a) a nominee, because payment is made on behalf of a' 
recipiens or at his or her instruction to a nominee; (b) an agent 'with 
authority to accept a payment on behalf of a principal, because of the' 
operation of principles of agency; (c) a conduit, because the payment. 
merely passes through him or her; and (d) a beneficiary, if a benefit 
results from an undue payment. If there is more than one' transaction, a 
distinction has to be drawn between different transactions involving 
different parties, causes, purposes and results. Even when different' 
transactions are involved there can be only one moment of payment. of 
an indebitum. 
Applied to the present case under discussion: If the appellant was a 
nominee of the club, the club would have beeQ the recipiens of 
R26 612,33. If the appellant was acting as an agent of the club, the club 
would have been the recipiens of R26 612,33. As the' appellant was held 
not be an agent of the club, (and it arguably seems, that appellant was 
not a nominee of the club), the appellant should have been held to be 
the recipiens of R26 61'2,33 and not a mere R4 435,40. The appellant 
was not merely a conduit of the club because the R4 435,40 remained 
with her and did not pass through her. In trying to make sense of such 
outcomes one has to distinguish between the two transactions: (a) the 
loan agreement between the appellant and the respondent; and (b) the 
agreement between the appellant and other creditors. The moment of 
indebitum took place when payment was made to the appellant by the 
respondent on 3 December 1998. 
By implication the Court decided that the appellant was the recipiens 
of R4 435.40, because she did not act as an agent, whilst she was not 
the recipiens of the amount of R26 612. 33 because'she was a conduit 
for that amount which passed through to the club. In other words, ,she 
was wearing the hat of a recipiens and the hat of a conduit in respect of 
different amounts of a payment made to her. This result cannot be 
satisfactorily explained. 
7 Conclusion 
The court held that the club was not a legal person but did not consider the 
nature of the legal relationship between the parties. Had the court 
considered whether the relationship between the members of the club was 
that of a partnership. the intention of the parties to the loan agreement would 
jetermine whether the agreement was entered into between the lender and 
t~e partnership or between the lender and the appellant. If the intention was 
the former one can argue that the "partners" in terms of their mutual 
11 and ate were responsible to collect the payments of capital plus interest 
from the persons to whom they lent money on behalf of the partnership and 

